Recently there has been a flurry of proposals on how to 'define' vagueness. These proposals are not meant to amount to theories of vagueness as, for instance, epistemic or supervaluational theories of vagueness are. That is, they are not meant to provide solutions to the raft of puzzles and paradoxes traditionally associated with vagueness. Rather, they are meant to give us a sense of which terms in the language are vague, and to use Matti Eklund's phrase, in what their vagueness consists. Doing this might be a prelude to a successful theory of vagueness, or it might just be an interesting classificatory question in its own right.
1 examples of apparently vague, and apparently non-vague, terms. We'll then look at which theories do the best job at systematising intuitions about these cases. I'll then argue that the best way to systematise our intuitions about these cases while respecting theoretically important commonalities and distinctions is to take vagueness to be indeterminacy, while staying silent for now on whether the indeterminacy is semantic or epistemic. In doing so I'm returning to a traditional view of vagueness, one that is discussed in such classic works as Kit Fine's statement of supervaluationism (Fine 1975) . So I make no claim to originality in my conclusions here, though I hope at least some of the arguments are original.
Examples
I'm going to introduce five classes of examples, which will serve as our data in what follows. I'll give a fairly tendentious description of each class to orient us before starting. Our five classes are (a) words that are indeterminate but not vague, (b) vague words that are not predicates, especially predicate modifiers, (c) vague predicates whose conditions of application are contentious, (d) vague predicates whose application depends on discrete states of the world, and (e) vague predicates that do not determine boundaries.
1a. Indeterminacy without Vagueness
Many philosophers, if asked, would say that vague words are those that have borderline cases. As noted above, Fine (1975) takes exactly this view. My preferred view, that vagueness is indeterminacy, is a simple generalisation of this view to non-predicates. But it is a commonplace of the literature on definitions of vagueness that this won't do because of examples of indeterminacy without vagueness. Two examples are commonly used. One of these is Sainsbury's example child* (Sainsbury 1991) . By definition, the extension of child* is the set of persons under sixteen years old, and its anti-extension is the set of persons eighteen years old or older.
Sixteen and seventeen year olds are borderline cases. The intuition is that even though child* has borderline cases it is not vague, because there are sharp boundaries to its borderline.
A similar case arrives with mass as it is used by a Newtonian physicist. (I'm grateful to Delia Graff Fara for pointing out the connection here.) As Field (1973) showed, mass is indeterminate between two meanings, rest mass and proper mass. But it is intuitively not vague, because it is determinate that it means either rest mass or proper mass. These cases are well discussed in the existing literature, and I won't say much more about them here, save to note that one of the examples that is usually taken to be very problematic for the vagueness as indeterminacy view, child*, is not synonymous with any term in any natural language. This is not a reason that it could not serve as a counterexample, because a definition should cover all terms actual and possible.
1b. Non-Predicate Vagueness
Not only predicates are vague. There is an extensive literature on vague singular terms. Arguably many determiners are vague. And, as I'll stress here, many predicate modifiers are vague.
We can make an intuitive distinction between vague and precise predicate modifiers.
Compare the following two (obviously artificial) predicate modifiers. (I owe these examples to David Chalmers.) Where F is a predicate such that Fa is true iff for some variable v, v(a) > x and v has a natural zero value (e.g. like height and unlike utility) then we can define doubly F and bigly F. It is true that a is doubly F iff v(a) > 2x and a is bigly F iff v(a)/x is big. Now there's a good sense in which doubly is a precise modifier, for the modification it makes to its attached predicate can be precisely defined, while bigly is a vague modifier. That's the sense in which I mean some modifiers are vague and others are precise. Note that even though doubly is precise it can be a constituent of a vague predicate, such as doubly tall. That makes sense; just as a vague sentence need only contain one vague word, so need a vague complex predicate need only contain one vague word. Now we might well ask whether natural language modifiers like very are vague or precise. I'm sad to say that I really don't have an answer to that question, but I think it's an excellent question. To get a sense of how hard it is, note one awkward feature of very -it is most comfortable attaching to words that are themselves vague. For instance (1a) is a sentence of English while (1b) is not.
(1) a. Jack is very old.
b. *Jack is very forty-seven years old.
I don't know whether this is a universal feature of very. My best guess is that it is though in conversation some people have proposed interesting putative counterexamples. 
a. An academic with one child has few children.
b. If an academic with one child has few children, then an academic with two children has few children.
c. If an academic with two children has few children, then an academic with three children has few children.
d. If an academic with three children has few children, then an academic with four children has few children.
e. If an academic with four children has few children, then an academic with five children has few children.
f. So an academic with five children has few children. 
1e. Vagueness without Boundaries
The letter of Greenough's proposal suggests that every vague term has only vague boundaries.
This is not true. The predicate in one's early thirties has a sharp boundary at the lower end and a precise boundary at the upper end. But it isn't too hard to amend his theory to allow for such cases, by saying (in effect) that a vague term is a term with at least one vague boundary. Nicholas
Smith makes basically that move in his paper. But such a move won't work, because some vague predicates don't have boundaries. Indeed, some predicates can be vague even though they are satisfied by every object in the domain. The examples here are a little more complicated than in the rest of the paper, but I think they are important enough to warrant the complexity.
For the next several paragraphs the domain will be adult Australian women, and when I use tall I'll mean tall for an adult Australian woman. I don't know enough facts to know where the boundaries are for tall in this context, but I'll stipulate that a woman shorter than 170cm is determinately not tall, and a woman taller than 180cm is determinately tall. I claim here neither that I know where these boundaries are nor that I could know where they are. But I assume there are boundaries. I'm making these stipulations because it is easier to follow the examples if I use 170 and 180 rather than variables like y and z. It will become obvious that the particular numbers won't matter, as long as there's separation between them. It also doesn't matter whether we use a semantic or epistemic account of determinacy here. It will matter that we use classical logic at various points (e.g. in assuming there are boundaries), but I think that's perfectly reasonable in this context. (Here I follow the arguments in section 2 of Greenough's paper.)
Consider the class of predicates defined by the following schema.
tall x = df tall or shorter than x cm For x < 170, tall x has all the same borderline cases as tall, and is presumably vague in anyone's book. For x > 180, tall x determinately applies to everyone in the domain, and for now we'll say that makes it not vague. (Though note it need not determinately determinately apply to everyone in the domain, and we'll see below that might be a reason to group it with the vague predicates.)
When x is between 170 and 180, tall x has some very odd properties. The borderline cases are those women whose height is between x and 180cm. When x is close to 180, this might be a very small border. While we're assuming classical logic, we can assume that there is a value y such that women taller than y cm are tall and those shorter than y cm are not tall. having a boundary at all, can work.
One might object here that a definition of vagueness is only meant to apply to words not phrases. But just as we can worry about a possible word child*, we can worry about a possible atomic word gish that means the same thing as tall 179 , so that move won't help here.
We now have enough data on the table. In the next section I argue that treating vagueness as being indeterminacy provides a satisfactory treatment of the data. In the third section I argue that none of the live alternatives is so satisfactory. So I conclude, somewhat tentatively, that we should define vagueness as indeterminacy.
Vagueness as Indeterminacy
Back when I was a supervaluationist, I thought that what it was for a term to be vague was for it to refer to different things on different precisifications. That won't do as a theory-neutral definition, for it presupposes supervaluationism, which is not only a theory but a false theory. But we can capture the essential idea is slightly less loaded language.
I will have to make three possibly controversial assumptions. First, I assume a broadly
Montagovian perspective, on which we can talk about the referent of an arbitrary term. That referent might be an object, or a truth value, or a function from objects to truth values, or a more complicated function built out of these. Second, I assume we can sensibly use an expanded Lagadonian language where objects can be names for themselves, truth-values can be names for 6 themselves, functions from objects to truth-values can be names for themselves, and so on. Third, I assume there is no metaphysical vagueness, so each of these Lagadonian names is not vague.
Those assumptions let us make a first pass at a definition of vagueness, as follows. A term t is vague iff there is some object, truth-value or function l which can serve as its own name such that the following sentence is neither determinately true nor determinately false.
(3) t denotes l.
That delivers the intuitively correct account in four of the five cases we discuss above, all except the cases like child*. I'll say much more about that case below. But it is in one respect slightly too liberal, and we need to make a small adjustment or two to fix this. Consider a predicate F that is defined over a vague domain, but which is determinately satisfied by every object in the domain. Intuitively it is a partial function, which maps every member of its domain to true. And assume for sake of argument that it is determinate that it maps every member of the domain to true. (Say, for example, it means is self-identical when applied to a member of the domain.) Such a predicate is not, I think, vague. But since it is indeterminate which partial function it denotes, the above theory suggests it is vague. We need to make a small adjustment. To state the corrected theory, we will stipulate that every term denotes a function. What were previously thought of as terms denoting constants will be treated as terms denoting constant functions. So instead of a name like Scott Soames denoting Scott Soames, we'll take it to denote the function that takes anything whatsoever as input, and returning Scott Soames as output. Given that, our second take at a definition of vagueness is as follows.
t is vague iff ∃x, y 1 , y 2 such that y 1 ≠ y 2 and it is indeterminate whether ∃l such that t denotes l and l(x) = y 1 , and it is indeterminate whether ∃l such that t denotes l and l(x) = y 2 .
To get a sense of the definition, it helps to translate it back into supervaluational talk, and look at the special case where t is a predicate. Then the definition comes to the claim that there is some object that is in the extension of t on one precisification, and in the anti-extension of t on another, Patrick Greenough (2003) suggests that the problem with terms like child* is that they aren't vague, but rather that they are simply undefined for the alleged borderline cases. If that's true, and perhaps for some of the examples people had in mind in this area it is, then our definition agrees that they are not vague. For a term that carves a precise division out of part of the domain, and then stays silent, is precise not vague on my account.
Greenough also suggests that the problem with child* is that it is not higher-order vague.
But as he says this can hardly be the entirety of the problem. For it does not seem to be definitional that the vague terms are also higher-order vague. 
Rival Definitions
I just mentioned the idea that a vague predicate could be defined as one that is susceptible to a Sorites argument. This account is sometimes attributed to Delia Graff Fara (2000) , but it seems quite a widespread view. For instance, Terence Horgan (1995) says that it is distinctive of vague predicates that they can be used to generate inconsistency because the Sorites premises attaching to them are true. As I mentioned, such views are vulnerable to a wide variety of counterexamples.
Many of these counterexamples also apply to rival definitions of vagueness.
Matti Eklund (2005) develops a similar kind of definition. He starts with Crispin Wright's (1975) famous definition of what it is for a predicate F to be tolerant.
Whereas large enough differences in F's parameter of application sometimes matter to the justice with which it is applied, some small enough difference never thus matters.
Eklund's position then is that F is vague iff it is part of semantic competence with respect to F to be disposed to accept that F is tolerant. Eklund agrees that it is inconsistent to assert that F is indeed tolerant. But as he has argued extensively elsewhere, the falsity of the tolerance principle is compatible with it being part of competence that one is disposed to accept it. Competent speakers are disposed to accept that whereas large enough differences in F's parameter of application sometimes matter to the justice with which it is applied, some small enough difference never thus matters.
Here's the wide scope reading of this.
F's parameter of application is such that whereas competent speakers are disposed to accept that large enough differences in it sometimes matter to the justice with which F is applied, some small enough difference never thus matters.
And here is the narrow scope reading, with a phrase added for emphasis.
Competent speakers are disposed to accept that whereas large enough differences in F's parameter of application, whatever it is, sometimes matter to the justice with which it is applied, some small enough difference never thus matters.
To see the difference between the two cases, assume for the sake of argument that a competent speaker thinks that to be good is to do actions whose consequences have a high enough utility, whereas in reality to be good is to obey enough of God's commands. In each case being good is vague, because we are using satisficing versions of consequentialism and divine command theory.
So the parameter of application for being good is the number of God's commands you obey. The competent speaker will not accept the wide scope version of tolerance with respect to being good, because they don't think that large differences with respect to how many of God's commands you obey matter to the justice with which being good is applied. Such cases can be multiplied endlessly to show that the wide scope version of Eklund's principle cannot generally be true, because it makes it the case that competent speakers have correct views on contentious philosophical matters the resolution of which goes beyond semantic competence. For these reasons Eklund has said (personal communication) that he intends the narrow scope version.
But the narrow scope version also faces some difficulties. The most direct problem is that one can be a competent user of a term like food or dangerous or beautiful without having any thoughts about parameters of application. I suspect I was a competent user of these terms before I even had the concept of a parameter of application. Even bracketing this concern, there is a worry that competence requires knowing of a term whether it is vague or not. But this seems to be a mistake. It is not a requirement of competence with moral terms like good that one know whether they are maximising or satisficing terms. Tom Wolfe and the students he observed while writing I Am Charlotte Simmons seemed to disagree about whether going out with is vague, but they were both competent users, they simply disagreed on something like a normative question. (See Wolfe 2000 for more on his take on matters.) And it seems that two users of language could disagree over whether is thinking is vague without disagreeing over whether either is a competent semanticist. They may well disagree over whether either is a competent philosopher of mind, but such disagreements are neither here nor there with respect to our present purposes. So I don't think that either disambiguation of Eklund's principle can properly account for vagueness in philosophically interesting terms. As with the two definitions considered so far, it is hard to see how this could possibly be generalised to cover vagueness in non-predicates. It's true (given our assumptions) that if a and b are similar in very tall-relevant respects, then 'a is very tall' and 'b is very tall' will be similar in respect of truth. But that doesn't show very is vague, for the same condition is satisfied when we replace very with the precise modifier doubly. This isn't an argument that Smith's definition couldn't be extended to cover modifiers, but a claim that it is hard to see how this will work. has few children. I say might rather than does because it is rather hard to work out how the higher-orders of vagueness work for such terms. I'll simply note that there are some plausible enough epistemic models on which has few children satisfies his requirement.
There is a problem which is distinctive to Greenough's view of his theory as a minimal theory. As Smith notes, Greenough makes it a requirement that vague boundaries are unknown.
But this is controverted in some mainstream theories, for example the version of supervaluationism in Dorr (2003) . Since Dorr's theory should not be ruled out by a minimal theory or a definition, this is a weakness in Greenough's theory.
The more philosophically interesting problems concern, appropriately enough, the philosophically interesting terms. Greenough has a proof that his definition is equivalent to a definition in terms of borderline cases. The proof has several assumptions, one of which being
that we know what the parameter of application of a vague term is. More precisely, he assumes that we know everyone older than an old person is old, which is unproblematic, but he also assumes that the proof generalises to all vague cases, and this amounts to the assumption that we know parameters of application. As we've seen, this isn't true of philosophically interesting vague terms. This leaves open the possibility that Greenough's theory, unlike Smith's and Eklund's theories, overgenerates. The following is probably not a live possibility in any interesting sense, but it isn't I think the kind of thing a definition (or minimal theory) should rule out by definition.
It is possible that a kind of mysterianism about ethics is true, and we cannot know whether good is vague or precise. For a concrete example, let's assume it is knowable that some kind of divine command theory is true, but it is unknowable whether to be good one must obey all of God's commands or merely enough of them, where it is vague what counts as enough of them.
In fact morality requires obeying all God's commands, but this is not knowable -for all we know the satisficing version is the true moral theory. If this is the case then good will be epistemically tolerant, for we cannot know that a small difference in how many of God's commands you obey makes a difference to whether you are good, or determinately good etc. But in fact good is precise, for it precisely means obeying all of God's commands. Earlier I objected to Eklund's theory because semantic competence does not require knowing parameters of application, especially as such. This is the converse objection -I claim that a term's being precise does not imply that we know, or even could know, that it applies in virtue of a precise condition. All that matters is that it does apply in virtue of a precise condition.
It's a constant danger in philosophy that one infer from the falsity of all extant rivals that one's preferred theory is correct. I certainly don't want to argue that because Eklund's, Smith's and Greenough's definitions are incorrect that the traditionalist definition I have offered must be right. But we can make that conclusion more plausible by noting how widely the arguments levelled here generalise. The philosophically interesting cases seem to tell against any definition of vagueness in terms of semantic competence, for they show that competent users can have exactly the same attitude towards vague terms as they have towards precise terms. And our moral example suggests that any definition in terms of epistemic properties will be in trouble for it might not be knowable whether a particular term is vague or precise. Finally, the cases of vague predicate modifiers raise difficulties for any attempt to define the vagueness of a term in terms of properties of sentences in which it is used rather than mentioned. For it seems that as long as very* attaches only to vague predicates, then whether very* is vague or precise will make no salient differences to the sentences in which it appears. So we have to look at sentences in which the allegedly vague term is mentioned. And while I don't have a definitive argument here, I think looking at the range of cases we want to cover, and in particular at the range of cases where tolerance-type principles fail to be non-vacuously satisfied, our best option for completing these sentences is to look whether the term has a determinate or indeterminate denotation. We can then pass the questions of what determinacy consists in, and in particular the question of whether it is an epistemic or semantic feature, to the theorist of vagueness.
